Abstract Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that securitize mortgages and issue mortgage-backed securities (MBS). In addition, the GSEs are active participants in the secondary mortgage market on behalf of their own investment portfolios. Because these portfolios have grown quite large, portfolio purchases (in addition to MBS issuance) are often thought to be an important force in the mortgage market. Using monthly data from 1993 to 2005 we estimate a VAR model of the relationship between GSE secondary market activities and mortgage interest rate spreads. We find that GSE portfolio purchases have no significant effects on either primary or secondary mortgage rate spreads. Further, we examine GSE activities and mortgage rate spreads in the wake of the 1998 debt crisis, and find that GSE portfolio purchases did little to affect mortgage rates. This empirical finding is robust to alternative identification assumptions and to alternative model and variable specifications.
Introduction
The housing-related government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac securitize pools of mortgages, thereby assuming their credit risk and allowing the resulting mortgage-backed securities (MBS) to trade as effectively AAA-rated securities. This process provides originators access to a liquid secondary market for their loans. Separately, the GSEs also issue corporate bonds to finance large, highly leveraged, portfolios of mortgages, often in the form of their own MBS.
The GSEs, through their portfolios, are large investors in the US mortgage market. At the end of 2004, GSE-issued MBS totaled nearly $2.7 trillion, or nearly 35% of outstanding home mortgage debt. At the same time, GSE portfolios totaled over $1.5 trillion, or more than 20% of total mortgage debt. In a typical month, roughly 40% of newly originated mortgages are securitized by the GSEs, and about 20% are bought by the GSEs' portfolios.
1 Given their important role in mortgage markets, one might expect the quantities purchased by the GSEs to affect the equilibrium prices in mortgage markets. Indeed, the GSEs' effect on mortgage rates has played a key role in the recent policy debates on how to reform the GSEs (Greenspan 2005).
Earnings from mortgages held in the GSEs' portfolios clearly benefit GSE shareholders. But these portfolios might also benefit mortgage originators and home buyers with conforming mortgages. Unusually heavy and sustained portfolio purchases might bid up the price of new mortgages, allowing originators greater profits or the opportunity to lower mortgage rates. However, the GSEs must finance such purchases by issuing corporate debt. Thus the extra demand for mortgage assets created by portfolio purchases might be largely offset by the increase in GSE corporate debt.
However, even if GSE portfolio purchases do not affect mortgage rates during normal times, the purchases might act as a stabilization mechanism during financial crises, with the GSEs acting as a buyer of last resort in the MBS market. The GSEs might then buffer mortgage originators from financial market shocks, thereby limiting the impact of shocks on mortgage rates and mortgage borrowers.
The ability of GSE portfolio purchases to affect MBS prices depends in part on whether investors view GSE-guaranteed MBS and GSE corporate debt as substitutes. Roll (2003) , among others, argues that foreign investors prefer holding GSE debt over GSE-guaranteed MBS because some GSE corporate bonds do not carry the prepayment risk inherent in MBS. In this view, GSE portfolio growth would stimulate lower-cost foreign capital to flow into US mortgage markets. By the same argument, however, this capital would flow out of corporate and treasury markets. Moreover, other intermediaries can construct synthetic securities based on MBS that strip out prepayment risk.
